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Leibniz’s claim that ours is the best of all possible worlds has intrigued and puzzled philosophers for 
centuries. As Paul Rateau notes in the preface to this book, the claim is often caricatured and misun-
derstood, for example by supposing that Leibniz must hold that all is good, or that everything that 
happens is for the best (these being claims made later by Alexander Pope, with whose work Leibniz’s 
has sometimes been conflated). Rateau thus seeks to explicate Leibniz’s doctrine of the best possible 
world, to show what Leibniz understood by it, and its implications, both theoretical and practical. 
This is no small undertaking, as is clear from the breadth of topics Rateau covers over the course of 
his study. 
The book contains an introduction, and then nine subsequent chapters arranged into four dis-
tinct parts. The first part is entitled ‘What is the best of possible worlds?’, and in it Rateau examines 
Leibniz’s notions of possibility, compossibility, perfection, harmony, contingency, and space and 
time, and outlines what Leibniz means when he calls our world the best. The second part, ‘Does the 
best exclude progress?’ considers whether Leibniz’s belief that our world is the best is compatible 
with progress, and how that progress might manifest. The third part, ‘The kingdom of minds’, con-
cerns the nature of minds, their degrees of perfection, love, and activity. The final part, ‘To act in the 
best possible world’, deals principally with Leibnizian ethics, and includes a discussion of whether 
atheists could be virtuous, before concluding with a chapter on the fate of optimism in France. 
The coverage is thus broad, but given the size of the book—a shade under 400 pages—Rateau 
has more than enough space at his disposal to do justice to each of the topics. And generally he does 
just that: his treatment of the various topics is careful and thorough, and at times very illuminating. 
But there are a number of exceptions. The topic of compossibility is one such example. It is well 
known that Leibniz holds that not all possible things are compossible; that is, that not all possible 
things can co-exist in one and the same world. This means that God has to choose between different 
collections of compossible things (i.e., different possible worlds), and as we know, Leibniz holds 
that God will choose the best of these. But why did Leibniz think that some possibles were 
incompossible with others? Rateau’s suggestion is that created things are necessarily finite and 
limited in perfection, and this essential limitedness gives rise to an opposition between certain of 
them: ‘The beings that constitute it [this world] are not opposed to other possibles on account of what 
they are positively, but on account of what they are not, on account of their deficiencies and what 
their nature excludes’ (71). He goes on to say that ‘On account of what it [a creature] contains of the 
positive, on account of its reality, its perfection, it agrees with all the possibles, but on account of its 
limits, its imperfection, it excludes the possibility of being anything other than itself, or of doing 
otherwise than it does (even if this other possible being that it is not, and this other possible action 
that it does not carry out, are conceivable in another world). Perfection is the source of compatibility, 
imperfection of incompatibility’ (72). This is an intriguing suggestion, and one which seems to imply 
that the more perfect a possible thing is, the greater its degree of compossibility (and vice versa), 
such that an angel would be compossible with more things than, say, a worm. Rateau does not appear 
to draw this conclusion, however, which is perhaps just as well, as it does not correspond to a view 
that Leibniz appears to have held. Instead, Rateau’s analysis leads him to claim of possible things 
that ‘Their compossibility means nothing other than their agreement, the agreement of their 
respective states. The pre-established harmony is the basis of compossibility’ (72), such that, for 
Leibniz, ‘incompossible is every creature which is not ordered to all the others, and whose states are  
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not precisely in agreement with theirs’ (73). Rateau’s claim raises various questions, not least why a 
creature not harmoniously ordered to other ones should thereby be incompossible (i.e., not jointly 
creatable) with them. There is also the question of textual support; in his discussion of the topic, 
Rateau cites relatively few texts, and the ones that he does cite do not obviously seem to point in the 
direction he wishes to go. Yet there are quite a number of texts in which Leibniz discusses com-
possibility. For example, there is a text (letter to Arnauld, 14 July 1686) in which Leibniz suggests 
that compossibility is based on substances having lawful relations to each other, and another (‘Defi-
nitions: being, possible, existing’) in which he suggests that it involves the substances not generating 
a contradiction. Both appear to militate against Rateau’s interpretation of compossibility, which men-
tions neither lawful relations nor contradictions. How does he propose to deal with these texts? Un-
fortunately it is impossible to say, because there is not even a mention of them here. Ultimately, then, 
one is left with the feeling that Rateau’s interpretation is reached much too cheaply. 
Nor is this an aberration. To give another example, later in the book, following a helpful dis-
cussion about Leibniz’s rejection of the eternal return (128-33), Rateau asserts that Leibniz inclines 
towards the doctrine of universal salvation (137). The textual case for this claim is very thin—indeed, 
one of the texts Rateau cites (on 138 note 1) actually has Leibniz stating that he doesn’t endorse the 
doctrine—and there are numerous texts in which Leibniz quite explicitly rejects it. But again, Rateau 
simply neglects to mention those, without it being clear why. Nor is there any mention—let alone 
discussion – of the secondary literature on this topic, some of which canvasses a much broader range 
of texts than does Rateau, and subjects those texts to more in-depth analysis than is to be found here. 
Such shortcomings are not a general feature of the book by any means, but they do undermine some 
of Rateau’s readings. The upshot is that a reader not already familiar with the relevant primary and 
secondary literature is apt to get the impression that some of Rateau’s conclusions are well-grounded 
and uncontroversial, even when they are anything but. 
The book does, however, end on a high note, with an informative and rewarding final chapter 
concerning the reception of Leibniz’s optimism in France from 1710 (the date he published the 
Theodicy) to 1765. It is popularly believed that Leibniz’s claim that ours is the best of all possible 
worlds enjoyed a good degree of popularity until the Lisbon earthquake (1755) and Voltaire’s satire, 
most notably in Candide (1759), made it unpalatable. Rateau, however, shows that this was not the 
case. He notes that Leibniz’s doctrine initially enjoyed a warm response in France, but this quickly 
gave way to suspicion (largely due to concerns about the orthodoxy of Leibniz’s religious beliefs), 
before evolving into outright hostility. This final change occurred, Rateau argues, in part because of 
the increasing French distaste for metaphysical systems, and in part because Leibniz’s doctrine 
became intimately associated with other discredited systems, such as that of Spinoza. For it was 
claimed—for example, in an influential set of reviews of the Theodicy written by an anonymous 
Jesuit for the Mémoires de Trévoux in 1737—that by supposing God would inevitably choose the 
best of all possible worlds, Leibniz had stripped God of free will, and introduced a fated 
necessitarianism into his thought, à la Spinoza. Leibniz’s doctrine thus came to be seen as dangerous 
and fundamentally anti-Christian. The perceived negative implications of Leibniz’s doctrine were 
then built into the very definition of ‘optimism’ offered by the Jesuits in 1752, which described it as 
a ‘spiritual Spinozism’ (353). Such pejorative judgements shaped the thinking of Encyclopaedists 
d’Alambert and Diderot, both of whom saw Leibniz’s doctrine of the best possible world as implying 
fatalism and leaving no room for free will, either God’s or man’s. Leibniz’s doctrine had thus been  
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roundly—if unfairly—discredited among the French even before the Lisbon earthquake and 
Voltaire’s satire delivered their own blows. 
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